Many mafiosi have begun their careers with violent acts (Hess 1973; Arlacchi 1983), but have subsequently relied on the reputation with which such acts provided them: 'basta la fama' wrote Franchetti (p. 104), in line with some of the most advanced game theory (see Milgrom and Roberts 1982, who show that, contrary to the standard economic claim, 'predatory practices' to maintain a monopoly are not irrational if reputation and future challengers are taken into account). They become persons with a reputation and are trusted, and, if interests diverge, they are trusted, in a limited but effective sense, to resort to

XREF: Connects to game theory literature (Milgrom and Roberts 1982) on reputation and credible threats, relevant to any work on signaling and deterrence.

Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking…, loc. 2212