In reality, al-Qaeda is an insignificant force, and its ability to recruit in the United States is highly limited. Even members of the security apparatus admit as much. A month before the release of the “counter-radicalization” document, the Washington Post reported that it was widely believed in the CIA, as well by counterterrorism officials, that al-Qaeda was all but finished. A Foreign Affairs article by John Mueller titled “The Truth about al-Qaeda” arrived at the same conclusion. Yet, despite the lack of any credible evidence to suggest that al-Qaeda remained a threat to national security, the Obama administration launched a plan to increase racial profiling of Muslim Americans. Why? There are a number of reasons, but one is certainly that the “counterinsurgency” strategy—that is, the attempt to “win hearts and minds”—was largely failing abroad. Obama therefore had to turn back to counterterrorism and resuscitate the “Islamic terrorist” enemy, albeit in liberal guise.

XREF: Connects to broader critiques of security theater and manufactured threats (e.g., Michael Hayden's admissions, or the 'blowback' literature on counterterrorism failures driving domestic surveillance).

Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politi…, loc. 584