Readers unfamiliar with this history might be surprised to learn that Islamists were not always seen as enemies. Instead, policymakers adopted a checkered approach driven by Cold War interests. At first, up until the 1970s, the political elite allied with Islamists. In the 1970s, though, this approach changed in response to various factors, including the Iranian revolution of 1979. After this, and up until the end of the Cold War, they had it both ways: Islamists were enemies in some cases, but not in others. The United States used the Holy Warriors in Afghanistan (the predecessors of al-Qaeda) to fight a proxy war with the Soviet Union. At the same time, particularly in the wake of the 1979 hostage crisis, Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran came to personify all things Islamic and evil. Realpolitik dictated that the United States must cut against some Islamists but ally with others against its main Cold War enemy.

XREF: Connects to the broader history of US foreign policy in the Middle East and the origins of al-Qaeda via the Afghan proxy war.

Deepa Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politi…, loc. 220