The solution is in two parts. First, one must try to design a super-alert response that has good endurance and little fatigue, recognizing that this means compromising its peak effectiveness. Second, and most pertinent to the present subject, one may have to engage in a kind of crash disarmament negotiation with the enemy during the period that one has in fact taken measures to insure his own invulnerability of retaliation. … It would mean negotiating not just under the ordinary pressure of knowing that sneak attack is a long-term danger, but doing it with clear notice that if measures to make successful first-strike impossible have not been devised, agreed upon, and taken by a quick deadline, war by mutual consent has become inevitable.

DEFINE: Describes Schelling's concept of crash disarmament negotiation, where mutual security requires bargaining against a deadline before first-strike capability forces war.

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 564