This is a series of closely interrelated essays in a field that is variously described as "theory of bargaining," "theory of conflict," or "theory of strategy." Strictly speaking, the subject falls within the theory of games, but within the part of game theory in which the least satisfactory progress has been made, the situations in which there is common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, tacit bargaining, extortion. The philosophy of the book is that in the strategy of conflict there are enlightening similarities between, say, maneuvering in limited war and jockeying in a traffic jam, between deterring the Russians and deterring one's own children, or between the modern balance of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.

XREF: Bridges game theory to everyday situations like traffic jams and parenting, echoing how behavioral economics applies formal models to ordinary life.

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 7