The fact that some kind of commitment, or at least appearance of commitment, must lie behind the threat and be successfully communicated to the threatened party is in contradiction to another notion that often appears in game theory. This is the notion that a threat is desirable, or admissible, or plausible, only if the reaction threatened would cause worse damage to the threatened party than to the party making the threat. This is the view of Luce and Raiffa, who characterize threats by the phrase, "This will hurt you more than it hurts me," explicitly making threats depend on interpersonal utility comparisons.

DEFINE: Distinguishes commitment-based credibility from the Luce/Raiffa view that threats hinge on interpersonal utility comparison. XREF: Relates to Schelling's broader work on commitment and credible threats in strategic interaction.

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 296