There is probably no single principle of game theory that epitomizes so strikingly the mixed-motive game as this principle that a worsening of some or even all of the potential outcomes for a particular player and an improvement in none of them may be distinctly—even dramatically—advantageous for the player so disadvantaged. It explains why a sufficiently severe and certain penalty on the payment of blackmail can protect the potential victim, how the burning of bridges behind one's self while facing an enemy may dishearten an enemy and induce his retirement, or why a lady might, in an earlier era, defy the search party by haughtily placing the sought object in her bosom.

XREF: Connects to Schelling's commitment and credibility work, and the concept of 'burning bridges' as a negotiation tactic. QUESTION: When does self-imposed disadvantage backfire rather than help? There must be boundary conditions on this principle.

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 358