Incidentally, dropping AB vertically in Fig. 2 to below the level αβ would illustrate an important principle, namely, that moving one point in a manner “unfavorable” to North may actually improve the outcome for him. The threat that kept him from winning in Fig. 2 depends on the comparative attractiveness of AB over αB for North; if AB is made worse for him than αβ he becomes immune to the threat, which then is not made, and he wins at αB. This is an abstract example of the principle that, in bargaining, weakness may be strength.

XREF: Connects to game theory concepts like commitment devices and the 'madman theory' in diplomacy, where appearing irrational or constrained can improve outcomes. Builds on: "Advantages in bargaining are not universal and can backfire."

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 130