Nor can we trip them up if we ask them how they arrived at their expectations. Any grounds that are consistent would do, since any grounds that each expects the other confidently to adopt are grounds that he cannot rationally eschew. Consistent stories are all they need; and if they say that a sign on the blackboard said A-$80, B-$20, or that they saw in a bulletin that two other players, named Aʹ and Bʹ, split $80-$20, and that they confidently perceived that this was clear indication to both of them of what to expect—that this was the only "expectable" outcome—we cannot catch them in error and prove them irrational. They may be irrational; but the evidence will not show it.

XREF: Connects to coordination games in game theory and theories of common knowledge, where self-fulfilling expectations create equilibria immune to rational critique.

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 653