Given the fact that, even if the enemy complies, there is some risk that the box detonates war before he has a chance to collect himself and do our bidding, there is an advantage in making it less than certain that the box will explode on any given day. In ordinary deterrence—where nothing happens unless the enemy acts contrary to our demand—to threaten too much may be superfluous but not self-defeating; in the present case—where the threat starts fulfilling itself at a specified rate over time as soon as we commit ourselves to it—too big a threat can defeat its purpose. In this situation the small-probability threat is not just a possible substitute for the large certain threat; it is a superior and necessary alternative.

DEFINE: The Doomsday Machine model distinguishes ordinary deterrence from bounded deterrence, where the threat self-fulfills over time and certainty becomes self-defeating.

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 442