Tacit bargaining requires coordination even among equivalent payoffs. [causal]
With full information about each other’s value systems and a homogeneous set of gains to be divided, there may be an infinity of equivalent solutions, all yielding the same values to the two players, but no difficulty in agreeing on an arbitrary choice among this indifferent set. But tacit bargaining often requires a further degree of coordination, namely, a coordinated choice even among equivalent divisions of the gains. Negotiation over a boundary line in homogeneous territory is thus different from the simultaneous dispatch of troops to take up positions representing claims (as in Question 6 on page 62); such claims may overlap and cause trouble even though the terrain values claimed are consistent.
DEFINE: Distinguishes negotiation over boundaries from simultaneous claim-staking, which can cause overlap conflicts even with consistent valuations.
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 859