A good laboratory example of the communication-perception part of game strategy is the experiment reported by M. M. Flood, who presented his players with a 2 × 2 nonzero-sum matrix for 100 consecutive tacit plays. The special property of the matrix is that the players can win only by cooperating on a particular cell on each play, but to distribute the winnings for the 100-play sequence they must cooperate on some pattern of alternation among two or more cells that discriminate differently between the two players. And the only means of negotiating over the distribution to be sought and concerting on a pattern of alternating play that achieves it is through the choices they actually make as the play proceeds.

XREF: This is an early formulation of coordination in repeated games, prefiguring focal points and tacit bargaining that Schelling elaborates elsewhere.

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 791