The distinctive feature of this threat is that the threatener has no incentive to carry it out either before the event or after. He does have an incentive to bind himself to fulfill the threat, if he thinks the threat may be successful, because the threat and not its fulfillment gains the end; and fulfillment is not required if the threat succeeds. The more certain the contingent fulfillment is, the less likely is actual fulfillment. But the threat's efficacy depends on the credulity of the other party, and the threat is ineffectual unless the threatener can rearrange or display his own incentives so as to demonstrate that he would, ex post, have an incentive to carry it out.

DEFINE: Distinguishes a threat from an empty bluff: the threat works if credible, and credibility requires binding oneself to the contingent action. Builds on: "Threats fail against adversaries who ignore rationality or lack alternatives."

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 96