The threat—if we call this contingent-behavior mechanism a "threat"—has some interesting features. It may exist whether we realize it or not. Even those who have doubted whether our massive-retaliation threat was a potent deterrent to minor aggression during the last several years, but are perplexed that the Russians have not engaged in more mischief than they have, can note that the threat we voiced was backed by an additional implicit threat that we might be triggered by Soviet actions in spite of ourselves. Furthermore, even if we prefer not to incur even a small probability of inadvertent war, and would not use this mechanism deliberately, the "threat" in question may be a byproduct of other actions that we have a powerful incentive to take. We may get this threat whether we like it or not when we (and the Russians) take precautions commensurate with a crisis; knowing this, the Russians may have to take the risk into account.

XREF: Connects to Schelling's broader work on commitment, brinkmanship, and the rationality of threats — the irrational/semi-automatic threat is a recurring theme in his strategic thought. Builds on: "Mixed commitments combine partial threats with partial promises to guide choice."

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 422