A second conclusion is that the principal inhibition on the use of atomic weapons in limited war may disappear with their first use. It is difficult to imagine that the tacit agreement that nuclear weapons are different would be as powerfully present on the occasion of the next limited war after they had already been used in one. We can probably not, therefore, ignore the distinction and use nuclears in a particular war where their use might be of advantage to us and subsequently rely on the distinction in the hope that we and the enemy might both abstain. One potential limitation of war will be substantially discredited for all time if we shatter the tradition and create a contrary precedent.

XREF: Connects to the concept of taboo norms and precedent-setting behavior; the idea that a single breach destroys a norm echoes sociological research on norm cascades. Builds on: "Nuclear test discussions reinforce tacit norms distinguishing nuclear weapons."

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 606