An interesting case of tacit and asymmetrical communication is that of a motorist in a busy intersection who knows that a policeman is directing traffic. If the motorist sees, and evidently sees, the policeman's directions and ignores them, he is insubordinate; and the policeman has both an incentive and an obligation to give the man a ticket. If the motorist avoids looking at the policeman, cannot see the directions, and ignores the directions that he does not see, taking a right of way that he does not deserve, he may be considered only stupid by the policeman, who has little incentive and no obligation to give the man a ticket. Alternatively, if it is evident that the driver knew what the instructions were and disobeyed them, it is to the policeman's advantage not to have seen the driver, otherwise he is obliged, for the reputation of the corps, to abandon his pressing business and hail the driver down to give him a ticket. Children are skilled at avoiding the receipt of a warning glance from a parent, knowing that if they perceive it the parent is obliged to punish noncompliance; adults are equally skilled at not requesting the permission they suspect would be denied, knowing that explicit denial is a sterner sanction, obliging the denying authorities to take cognizance of the transgression.

DEFINE: Characterizes tacit, asymmetrical communication where non-perception strategically avoids triggering reciprocal obligations.

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, loc. 344