There is one aspect of the data that neither the Fehr–Schmidt nor Falk–Fischbacher model predicts satisfactorily. Recall that third-party punishment was not significantly affected by the sum received from one’s own dictator (see regression 2 in Table 3). This contradicts both models because the more a third party receives from his or her own dictator, the less reason there is for him or her to punish the dictator in the other group, since the income difference between the third party and the dictator in the other group becomes smaller if one’s own dictator transfers more. The insignificant impact of one’s own dictator’s transfer on thirdparty punishment is consistent with Levine’s model, however, because the behavior of one’s own dictator does not affect inferences about the dictator’s preferences in the other group.

XREF: Connects to behavioral economics models of fairness, reciprocity, and third-party punishment; could relate to earlier reading on Dictator Game results.

Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and …, loc. 109