However, we hypothesized that the salient distribution norm in the DG is for A to give 50 points to B; since subjects played the game anonymously and were randomly allocated to their roles and, hence, their endowments, there is no good reason why A should end up with more money than B, making the equality norm salient. … In addition, by asking B what punishment B expects C to impose on A, we receive information on the extent to which directly affected parties expect third-party norm enforcement, and how accurate their expectations are. This information is important because the impact of social norms on behavior should increase the more people believe in the presence of third-party norm enforcement.

QUESTION: The study frames equality as the "salient" norm when endowments are randomly assigned. Interesting question: how differently do subjects behave when endowments are earned rather than random?

Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and …, loc. 28